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Lever Brothers Corp. v. United States: An Expansion
of Trademark Protection Beyond the Limits of
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.
I. Introduction
In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
(D.C.) Circuit tentatively held in Lever Brothers Corp. v. United States I
that section 133.21(c)(2) of the United States Customs Service regu-
lations2 was invalid with respect to section 42 of the Lanham Act. 3
Because the plaintiff, Lever Brothers Corporation (Lever), sought an
injunction against the United States Customs Service (Customs), and
because there was no evidence in the record of the legislative history
1 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Lever II].
2 Relevant parts of section 133.21, 19 C.F.R., provide:
(a) Copying or simulating marks or names. Articles of foreign manufacture
bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded trademark or trade
name shall be denied entry and are subject to forfeiture as prohibited impor-
tations. A "copying or simulating" mark or name is an actual counterfeit of
the recorded mark or name or is one which so resembles it as to be likely to
cause the public to associate the copying or simulating mark with the recorded
mark or name.
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corpora-
tion or association created or organized within the United States are subject
to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions of (a) and (b) of this section
do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned
by the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are
parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common
ownership or control (see §§ 133.2(d) and 122.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner. (emphasis
added).
On its face, subsection (a) appears to implement section 42 of the Lanham Act, infra
note 3, subsection (b) appears to implement section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, infra
note 16, and subsection (c) contains exceptions to the prohibitions found in subsections
(a) and (b).
3 Section 42 of the Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988), provides in rele-
vant part:
[No article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of
the any [sic] domestic manufacture, or manufacturer ... or of any manufac-
turer ... located in any foreign country ... or which shall copy or simulate a
trademark registered in accordance with the provisions of the chapter or
shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the
article is manufactured in the United States ... shall be admitted to entry at
any customshouse of the United States. (emphasis added)
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behind section 42 or of the administrative practice in implementing
section 42, the court limited its holding and remanded the case to
the district court for consideration on those grounds.4 The appellate
court required, however, that on remand Customs unveil convincing
proof from the legislative history or administrative record that the
appellate court's tentative decision was erroneous.5 Unable to meet
this burden, Customs lost in the lower court and appealed. 6 On Jan-
uary 15, 1993, the appellate court finalized its 1989 holding and af-
firmed the district court. 7 Consequently, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit became the first circuit court to invalidate Customs
regulations based on a section 42 challenge. 8
The Customs regulations challenged allowed unauthorized third
parties to import into the United States "Shield" soap and "Sun-
light" dishwashing liquid manufactured in the United Kingdom by
Lever Brothers Limited (Lever UK), an affiliate of Lever.9 The im-
ported products, known as "gray market" goods,' 0 directly com-
peted against Shield soap and Sunlight dishwashing liquid sold by
Lever." The affiliated relationship between Lever and Lever UK,
according to Customs, prevented the gray market goods from "copy-
ing" or "simulating" Lever's trademarked goods, as required for
seizure by section 42 of the Lanham Act.' 2 Lever brought suit chal-
lenging Customs' interpretation of "copy or simulate" in section 42
because the gray market goods were undermining sales of its prod-
ucts in the United States, and because the gray market goods materi-
ally differed from their American counterparts, thereby causing
consumer confusion and dissatisfaction resulting in damage to
4 Lever 1, 877 F.2d at 111.
5 Id.
6 The district court on remand found that the legislative history behind section 42
was inconclusive concerning the "affiliate exception" of section 133.21(c)(2), and that
Customs' administrative practice was inconsistent. Lever Bros. Corp. v. United States, 796
F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992) [hereinafter Lever III]; see infra notes 77-87 and accompanying
text.
7 Lever Bros. Corp. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Lever IV].
8 One commentator has found that the D.C. Circuit is the sole court to invalidate
Customs regulations under Lanham Act analysis. Rian Miller-McIrvine, Note, TRADE-
MARK LA W-Gray Market Goods in Domestic Markets-Lever Bros. v. United States, 63 TEMP. L.
REV. 189 (1990).
9 Lever and Lever UK are affiliated through Unilever N.V., a Netherlands corpora-
tion. Lever 11, 877 F.2d at 102.
10 Gray market goods are trademarked goods imported by parties unrelated to and
without consent of the domestic trademark owner. The imported goods are "gray" rather
than "black" because the trademark has been lawfully applied by either the domestic
trademark owner, an affiliate or a licensee of the domestic trademark owner, or a licensor
to the domestic trademark owner. Gray market goods are also commonly referred to as
parallel imports. See generally Hugh C. Hansen, Gray Market Goods: A Lighter Shade of Black
13 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 249 (1987).
11 Lever H, 877 F.2d at 103.
12 Id. at 104.
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Lever's goodwill. 13
In finding that section 42 prohibited the importation of materi-
ally differing gray market goods, the court of appeals found the affili-
ated relationship irrelevant in determining the plain meaning of
"copy or simulate" in section 42.14 Interestingly, by disregarding
the affiliated relationship, the court has allowed a domestic regis-
tered trademark owner to obtain an injunction under section 42,
even though the Supreme Court in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 15 de-
termined in 1988 that similar relief was unavailable under section
526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930,16 a closely related statute. 17
This Note examines the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal's reliance
in Lever on the "territoriality" theory of trademarks in relation to
"universalism,""' and compares Lever with other recent decisions
13 Id. at 103.
14 Id. at 109.
15 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
16 Section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988), provides in
relevant part:
(a) Importation prohibited
Except as provided .. .it shall be unlawful to import into the United States
any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label,
sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a
citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the
United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Offices ... unless
written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of
making entry.
17 Section 526(a) was spawned by the Second Circuit's decision in A. Bourjois & Co.
v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (1923), and was intended to overrule the Second Circuit's holding. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 484 U.S. 281, 303 (1988) (Brennan,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). It is debatable if Congress intended any other effect of section 526(a).
Id. Subsequent to the enactment of section 526(a), the Supreme Court overruled the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). Later that year in
another case, A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923), the Court overruled
another Second Circuit opinion on the basis of Katzel and section 27 of the Trade-Mark
Law of 1905, infra note 55, the precursor to section 42 of the Lanham Act, see infra note
157. Hence, section 526(a) is related to section 42 by the Court's incorporation of Katzel
into section 27. Provided that Congress intended section 526(a) only to overrule the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Katzel, and provided that the Supreme Court's decision in Katzel is
applicable only to the specific facts of the case, then section 42 would provide no greater
protection than section 526(a).
18 Under territoriality, a trademark represents the goodwill of the domestic trade-
mark owner, regardless of the identity of the manufacturer. See, e.g., Dial Corp. v. Encina
Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951, 954 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1986). The theory evolved from the Supreme
Court's decision in Katzel, and rests upon the premise that a genuine trademark, or trade-
marked good, is one which the domestic trademark owner stands behind and sponsors in
the domestic marketplace. Id. In Lever, imported Shield and Sunlight products would in-
fringe Lever's trademark rights because the public would generally believe Lever manufac-
tured and distributed the products. Id.
Under universalism, a trademark represents the source of origin of its product, where
the source of origin is defined strictly as the manufacturer. Id. Such a trademark, or trade-
marked good, is defined to be genuine if it makes such a representation. See e.g., Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., 816 F.2d 68, 74-76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 847 (1987). In Lever, imported Shield and Sunlight products would not infringe
Lever's trademark rights because the imported trademarked goods would accurately indi-
cate, albeit indirectly, their manufacturer, Lever UK, because of Lever's affiliation. See
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 18
concerning the issue of gray market goods giving rise to infringe-
ment actions. Part II of this Note elaborates on the facts and hold-
ings of Lever. Part III explores the relevant background law and
competing trademark theories. Part IV examines the present case in
relation to similar cases, evaluating the relevant trademark theory
supporting each case. This Note concludes by demonstrating that
Lever's extension of trademark protection is in conflict with the im-
plications of the Supreme Court's decision in K Mart, and that Lever
should be overruled as a matter of positive law.19
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Lever manufactures Shield soap and Sunlight dishwashing liquid
in the United States and is the registered trademark owner of each
product.20 Lever UK, an affiliated company,2 1 manufactures Shield
soap and Sunlight dishwashing liquid in the United Kingdom and
owns the trademarks there.22 Even though the companies are affili-
ated and their trademarks are identical, their products differ
markedly.2 3
Shield soap manufactured in the United States lathers rather
quickly compared to its counterpart in the United Kingdom. 24 Fur-
thermore, the United States version contains an anti-bacterial agent
lacking in the other,2 5 and each contains different perfume ingredi-
Lever IV, 981'F.2d at 1335. After all, Unilever N.V. controls both Lever's and Lever UK's
production of Shield and Sunlight as well as use of the trademarks, and benefits from sales
by both companies. Id.
For a discussion of these competing theories, see generally, Kaoru Takamatsu, Parallel
Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433 (1982).
19 This Note will show that the result reached in Lever II and finalized in Lever IV is
probably incorrect as a matter of positive law. However, the result reached is more likely
socially desirable. See e.g., Lars H. Liebeler, Note, Trademark Law, Economics and Grey-Market
Policy, 62 IND. L.J. 753 (1987) (finding a total ban on gray market imports the optimum
alternative). But see Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Applying Grecian Formula to Interna-
tional Trade: K Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc. and the Legality of Gray Market Imports, 75 VA. L. REV.
1397 (1989) [hereinafter Legality of Gray Market Imports] (arguing that Congress should
amend the Lanham Act to allow importation of gray market goods that are identical to the
domestic trademarked goods, but prohibit gray market goods that materially differ). This
Note does not address the normative values of the Lever decision.
20 Lever Bros. Corp. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 403,404 (D.D.C. 1987) [hereinaf-
ter Lever I].
21 Lever 1l, 877 F.2d 101, 102 n.I (D.C. Cir. 1989). Lever is a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of Unilever U.S., Inc., which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Unilever N.V.
Similarly, Lever UK is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Unilever P.L.C., a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Unilever N.V. Thus, Lever and Lever UK are affiliated through a corporate
grandparent. Id.
22 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
23 Lever I1, 877 F.2d at 103. The differences apparently arise from the different com-
mercial regulations, climates, and consumer tastes of the two countries. Id.
24 Id. (referring to Hockey Aff., Joint Appendix 214).
25 Id. (referring to Hockey Aff., Joint Appendix 213).
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ents and colorants. 26 The U.S. version of Sunlight has been
designed for use in soft water typically found in America's taps, while
the United Kingdom version of Sunlight has been designed for use
in hard water generally found in the United Kingdom. 27 Conse-
quently, the British Sunlight does not perform well in America. 28
Apart from performance, the products' packaging also differs.
The American Shield logo is written in block form with a grid back-
ground,29 and small print identifies its ingredients and its country of
origin as the United States.30 The British Shield logo is written in
script form and employs a wave in its background. 3' The soap is
wrapped in foil and small print identifies the United Kingdom as its
country of origin.3 2 As for the dishwashing products, the United
States version comes in the shape of a flattened hourglass, is yellow,
and lists "Sunlight Dishwashing Liquid" on its label.3 3 The United
Kingdom version comes in a cylindrical drum, employs "Sunlight
Washing Up Liquid" on its label, and displays a royal emblem lo-
cated below the spout bearing the legend, "By Appointment to Her
Majesty the Queen." '3 4
Third parties have imported the United Kingdom versions of
Shield and Sunlight into the United States. 35 Selling at a lower price
in the United States than their counterparts, the United Kingdom
versions have been confused with discounted American products by
consumers.3 6 Due to the imported products' failure to meet Ameri-
can expectations, Lever has received many letters of complaint from
angry and dissatisfied consumers. 37 In order to protect its reputa-
tion for quality, Lever sought to curve consumer confusion by peti-
tioning Customs to bar further importations of the United Kingdom
versions of Shield and Sunlight.38 Lever claimed that the importa-
tions were in violation of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and
section 42 of the Lanham Act. 39 Customs declined to bar importa-
tion because the imported goods fell under an "affiliated exception"
26 Id. (referring to Hockey Aff., Joint Appendix 216).
27 Id. (referring to Hockey Af., Joint Appendix 217). Hard water contains a higher
mineral concentration compared to soft water.
28 Id.
29 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
30 Lever 1, 877 F.2d at 103. Apparently the United Kingdom Shield does not list its
ingredients on its packaging, constituting a FDA violation when sold in the United States.
Id.
31 Lever IV, 981 F.2d at 1331.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Lever 1I, 877 F.2d at 103.
35 Id. A judicially noticed assumption is that these third party imports of the British
products are without the consent of Lever or any one of its affiliates. Id. at 103 n.3.
36 Id. at 103.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Lever 1, 652 F. Supp. 403, 404 (D.D.C. 1987).
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rule as found in section 133.21(c)(2) of Customs regulations. 40 In
Customs' view, both section 526(a) and section 42 admitted an affili-
ate exception.
B. First Round of Litigation
Because of Customs' refusal to bar importation, in 1987 Lever
sued for injunctive relief against Customs alleging that section
133.21(c)(2) was inconsistent with section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of
1930 and section 42 of the Lanham Act. 4 ' The District Court for the
District of Columbia denied relief. The court found, with respect to
the section 526(a) claim, that Customs did not intend to modify the
scope of the Tariff Act of 1930 by section 133.21(c)(2) of its regula-
tions,42 and that Customs' regulations were a reasonable guideline
for initiating administrative enforcement. 43 With respect to Lever's
section 42 claim, the district court found the section inapplicable to
the facts of the case. The court noted that section 42 was designed
to bar goods whose trademarks copied or simulated domestic trade-
marks. 44 Relying on previous case law, the district court interpreted
section 42 only to prohibit goods bearing counterfeit or spurious
trademarks. 45 The court accepted the argument by Customs that
Lever UK's trademarks were genuine in the United States because of
the affiliate relationship, regardless of any material differences be-
tween the goods or of any possible objection by Lever to the
importation.
Lever appealed both rulings to the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit.46 In 1989, the appellate court found that the section
526(a) claim was precluded by the Supreme Court's decision the pre-
40 Id. at 404-05. For text of section 133.21, see supra note 2 above.
41 Id. at 404.
42 Id. at 405. In its holding, the district court respectfully disagreed with the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeal's finding in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trade-
marks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (1986), rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), that section 13 3 .21 (c)(2) was an interpretation of the statutory
scope of section 42 and section 526(a), and not codification of enforcement discretion. Id.
at 405 n.4. Arguably the Supreme Court implicitly resolved the issue when it treated the
regulations as defining the scope of section 526(a) in K Mart. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smart,
Squaring the Gray Goods Circle, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1963, 1977 (1989); see also infra notes
173-83 and accompanying text. For an overview of how courts viewed Customs regula-
tions prior to K Mart, see infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
43 Lever 1, 652 F. Supp. at 405. The court announced several policy considerations in
support of upholding section 133.21 (c)(2) as a reasonable exercise of enforcement discre-
tion: avoiding the administrative costs associated with determining which imported goods
bearing identical trademarks of domestic goods, but manufactured by an affiliate abroad,
would impair the goodwill of the domestic trademark registrant; deferring to Congress'
acquiescence in Customs' regulations; and avoiding premature judicial action by awaiting
the result of K Mart, a case then pending appeal in which the Court would decide the
validity of section 133.21 (c)(2) against a section 526(a) challenge. Id.
44 Id. at 406-07.
45 Id. at 407.
46 Lever 11, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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vious year in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.4 7 Nevertheless, Lever's sec-
tion 42 claim was presented and proved successful. In finding for
Lever, the court of appeals invalidated section 133.21(c)(2) as con-
trary to the purpose of the Lanham Act.4 8
The court specifically employed Chevron analysis 49 in judging
Customs' interpretation of the act. Finding that Congress did not
explicitly express its intent on the affiliate exception, the court noted
that Customs' interpretation was to be deferred to unless unreasona-
ble.50 Because the underlying substance of the affiliate exception
was promulgated before the enactment of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, a statement explaining Customs' reasoning and purpose of
the promulgation was not included, nor was an administrative record
compiled. 5' Without such insight into an agency's thinking, the
court undertook to judge the reasonableness of the exception based
upon its own interpretation of section 42.52
In determining the scope of the statute, the court looked to A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel 53 and A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge,54 two
Supreme Court cases from 1923 that implicate section 27 of the
Trade-Mark Law of 1905 (the predecessor of section 42), 55 as well as
to Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 56 a 1924 Supreme Court decision exploring
an underlying purpose of trademarks. From these cases, the court
47 See id. at 104 n.6 (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988)).
48 Id. at 105.
49 The Chevron analysis is a two step procedure employed by courts when reviewing
the validity of an agency's interpretation of statutory language. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The first step is to look
to see if Congress addressed the specific question in issue. Id. at 842. If the issue was
addressed, then Congress' determination is controlling. However, if the issue was never
addressed, then step two is to judge the reasonableness of the statutory construction, and
not its correctness. Id. at 866. An in depth discussion of the Lever court's application of
Chevron analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.
50 Lever H, 877 F.2d at 105.
51 Id. at 105. Section 553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59
(1988), requires that a statement of purposes and basis accompany the promulgation of
any rulemaking.
52 Lever H, 877 F.2d at 105. The court found the general sweep of the Lanham Act to
'undeniably bespeak an intention to protect domestic trademark holders from foreign
competitors who seek to free ride on the goodwill of domestic trademarks." Id. See also
infra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
53 260 U.S. 689 (1923). See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
54 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam). See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
55 See infra note 157. Section 27 of the Trade-Mark Law of 1905, 33 Stat. 724, 730
(1905) provides, in relevant part:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of
any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer or trader, or of any manufac-
turer or trader located in any foreign country ... or which shall copy or simu-
late a trade-mark registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act, or
shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the
article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any
foreign country or locality other than the country or locality in which it is in
fact manufactured, shall be admitted to entry at any custom-house of the
United States. (emphasis added).
56 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
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of appeals arrived at two principles of trademark law: first, that
trademarks are designed to protect an owner's goodwill from third
persons' exploitation of consumer confusion between the owner's
trademarked goods and other trademarked goods; and second, that
trademarks can encompass a specific territorial scope. 57 The court
concluded that these two principles supported its ruling. 58 First, be-
cause the United Kingdom Shield and Sunlight trademarks represent
materially different products than those found in the United States,
the court felt that use of the United Kingdom trademarks in the
United States simply would not be truthful. 59 This would lead to
consumer confusion resulting in impairment of Lever's goodwill in
the United States. Thus importation of the gray market goods would
violate the first principle. Second, the court felt that the United
Kingdom trademarks were capable of infringing the United States
trademarks, even though the two trademarks were owned within a
corporate family, since the United States trademarks could be attrib-
uted to Lever's goodwill alone under the second principle. 60
The court refused to accept any post-hoc justification for the af-
filiate exception offered by Customs. 6' First, the court rejected the
argument that because of the affiliated relationship, the domestic
and foreign trademark owners should resolve any problems in the
"boardroom," e.g., contractually limit distributors' right to import
the product to the United States, or make distinctive modifications
between the identical trademarks. 62 The court thought that such
boardroom action would be ineffective, and further remarked that in
finding the "right" trademark, "the resources of English are finite
and the quest for an apt word costly."'63 Second, the court rejected
the argument that American consumers should have access to the
lower-priced, United Kingdom goods.64 The court found that mo-
57 Lever /, 877 F.2d 101, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
58 Id. *at 108.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 109-10. The court rejected Customs' central argument that without section
133.21 (c)(2), Lever would be protected from infringement by its own mark, a legal impos-
sibility. Id. Whereas Customs found a trademark could be genuine based solely upon the
affiliated relationship between the domestic and foreign trademark owners, and thereby
determined that no foreign trademark could infringe its affiliated domestic trademark, the
court of appeals found that the affiliated relationship was a relevant consideration only if
the affiliate were the party importing the goods. The court viewed the affiliate exception
under a theory of implied consent. The court found that consent to importation by an
affiliate could be inferred from the affiliation. As to imports by third parties, the court
found it implausible that consent to importation could arise from the domestic trademark
owner's affiliation with the foreign manufacturer. Id.
61 Id. at 110-11.
62 Id. at 110.
63 Id. But see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 302 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that such remedies are adequate substi-
tutes to prohibiting gray market imports all together).
64 Lever H, 877 F.2d 101, 110. (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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nopolies were inherent in the law of trademarks,65 and furthermore,
that there was no showing that consumer gain through access to
cheaper goods would outweigh consumer cost resulting from confu-
sion over trademark representation. 66 Finally, the court rejected
Customs' argument that the interpretation embodied in section
133.21(c)(2) is an administrative necessity. 67 While Customs argued
that invalidating section 133.21 (c)(2) would lead to large administra-
tive costs associated with determining which imported goods in cases
of affiliation were so materially different so as to impair the goodwill
of the domestic trademark, the court found that argument to be
greatly overstated. 68 The court felt that Customs would only be re-
quired to distinguish between identical and non-identical goods and
that such a task would entail minimal administrative costs.69
In reaching its decision, the court also discounted Customs' reli-
ance upon the parallel import and gray market lines of cases 70 which
culminated in 1988 with K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 7 1 In rejecting
this reliance, the court noted that these cases usually involved im-
ported goods identical to those sold by the domestic trademark
owner,72 but also noted that in the two cases where the gray goods
were not identical, infringement was found. 73 The court thought it
irrelevant that these two cases involved not an affiliated relationship
65 A discussion of the tensions between trademark law and antitrust law are beyond
the scope of this Note. For a thorough discussion of how these tensions have grappled
over time, see Daniel M. McClure, Trademark and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305 (1979). For a discussion of antitrust concerns in grant-
ing injunctions under section 526(a) and the Lanham Act, see Legality of Gray Market Im-
ports, supra note 19, at 1418-21. For discussions by courts about whether Customs
regulations should be upheld because of antitrust concerns, see Olympus Corp. v. United
States, 792 F.2d 315, 319-20 (2d Cir. 1986)(finding such support tenuous), cert. denied, 486
U.S. 1042 (1988); Osawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(finding wisdom in allowing Customs to consider antitrust concerns questionable).
66 Lever 11, 877 F.2d at 110.
67 Id. at 110-11.
68 Id. at 110.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 108-109. The cases discounted by the court of appeals included: Weil Ce-
ramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.) (finding section 42 did not prohibit
gray market imports), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989); NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco,
810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.)(finding sections 32 and 43 of Lanham Act do not bar gray market
imports), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315,
321 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding section 42 did not prohibit gray market imports), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987); Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (America) Corp., 707 F.2d
1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that sale of gray market goods does not constitute
infringement under California common law); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.
Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding section 32 does not bar gray market imports).
71 486 U.S. 281 (1988). See infra notes 176-183 and accompanying text.
72 Lever /, 877 F.2d at 106.
73 Id. at 109. These two cases are Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada
Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (barring gray market imports under section 32),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987), see infra notes 201-11 and accompanying text; and Dial
Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (barring gray market imports
under section 32), see infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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but rather a licensor-licensee relationship, since the inference of con-
sent to importation was absent in both. 74
In finding for Lever, however, the court qualified its holding. 75
Because of the lack of evidence of the legislative history of section 42
of the Lanham Act and lack of history concerning Customs' adminis-
trative practice, the court remanded the case for further argument
within this limited scope, placing the burden on Customs to deduce
"persuasive evidence running against" its tentative holding. 76
C. Lever on Remand
Faced with such an onerous burden, Customs lost on remand.
In searching the legislative history, the district court found that the
issue of the affiliate exception was never addressed by Congress,
although a closely related "common-ownership" exception was ac-
knowledged but neither endorsed nor condemned by Congress. 77
Furthermore, the noted exception occurred where the goods im-
ported were identical to the domestic goods.78 As for the adminis-
trative practice, the court found Customs' enforcement of section
133.21(c)(2) inconsistent at best. 79 The court noted that Customs'
adopted a "related companies" exception in 1953,80 abandoned it in
1959,81 and then promulgated the current affiliate exception in
1972,82 only to reverse its position in an amicus curiae brief in 1983.83
The court also noted that Customs recently proposed a rule to delete
the exception of allowing importation of gray market goods manu-
factured by foreign licensees of the domestic registered trademark
owner,8 4 the exception struck down in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. as
inconsistent with section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930.85 Cus-
toms' proposed deletion of this licensee exception weakened its posi-
tion supporting the affiliate exception, according to the court,
because "there is little substantive difference between the unauthor-
ized importation of a licensee's goods and the unauthorized importa-
74 Lever 11, 877 F.2d at 109-10. Concerning the implied consent theory of the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, see supra note 60.
75 Lever 11, 877 F.2d at I11.
76 Id.
77 Lever 111, 796 F. Supp. 1,4 (D.D.C. 1992). See also infra notes 158-60 and accompa-
nying text, and notes 274-78 and accompanying text.
78 Lever 111, 796 F. Supp. at 4.
79 Id.
80 Id. (citing 18 Fed. Reg. 8685, 8688 (1953)). Note that Customs is a department of
the Treasury.
81 Id. at 4-5 (citing 24 Fed. Reg. 7522 (1959)).
82 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing 37 Fed. Reg. 20677 (1972)).
83 Id. at 1337. (citing Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Bell & Howell:
Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983)). Customs argued, however,
that its position in the brief attacking the affiliate exception does not reflect agency policy
because the Treasury Department did not authorize it. Id.
84 Lever III, 796 F. Supp. at 5.
85 486 U.S. 281, 290 (1988).
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tion of a foreign affiliate's goods." '8 6 The court concluded its review
of the administrative practice by noting that, like the legislative his-
tory, Customs never actually addressed the specific case where the
imported goods materially differed from the domestic goods.8 7
On January 15, 1993, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court and held that neither the legislative history of sec-
tion 42 of the Lanham Act, nor federal statutory trademark law in
general, addressed the issue of an affiliate exception, and that the
administrative practice of Customs in implementing section 42 was
inconsistent at best.88 In the opinion, Judge Sentelle stated that the
court was restrained by its previous decision from considering any-
thing other than the legislative history and administrative practice,
and therefore he refused to examine the court's previous interpreta-
tion of section 42.89 He noted that "to warrant divergence from the
law of the case, a court must not only be convinced that its earlier
decision was erroneous; it must also be satisfied that adherence to
the law of the case will work a grave injustice." 90 The court was
forced to conclude that section 133.21(2)(c) was inconsistent with
section 42, and therefore void.
III. Background
A. Development of Federal Trademark Law Affecting Imports
1. Early Federal Trademark Law: Universalism
Federal statutes regulating the importation of trademarked
goods date back to 1871 when Congress decided to prohibit foreign
watch parts which copied or simulated the name or trademark of any
domestic manufacturer.9 1 An exception was allowed if the importer
was also the domestic manufacturer.9 2 The Treasury Department in-
terpreted the Tariff Act of 1871 to give domestic watch manufactur-
86 Lever III, 796 F. Supp. at 5.
87 Id.
88 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
89 Id. at 1332.
90 Id. Assuming that the court of appeal's previous holding was erroneous, grave
injustice would not result from this case, since the present court vacated the lower court's
order prohibiting Customs from applying the affiliate exception in cases of materially dif-
fering gray market goods. Perhaps because of doubts about the previous holding, the
court of appeals rejected Lever's boilerplate language requesting "such other and further
relief as the Court may deem just and proper," and narrowly limited relief to an injunction
prohibiting Customs from applying the affiliate exception to imports of only the United
Kingdom Shield and Sunlight products. Id. at 1338.
91 Id. at 1333 (citing Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 125, § 1, 16 Stat. 580). The relevant
part of the statute prohibits the importation of "watches, watch cases, watch movements,
or parts of watch movements, of foreign manufacture, which shall copy orsimilate the name
or trade-mark of any domestic manufacturer." Id. (emphasis added). This statute is the
origin of the "copy or simulate" language found in section 42 of the Lanham Act and
section 133.21 of Customs regulations at issue in Lever. See supra notes 2 and 3.
92 Id. at 1333.
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ers control over imports bearing their trademarks. 93 Congress
extended this trademark protection in 1883 to all domestic manufac-
turers regardless of what goods they produced. 94 However, control
of imports by the domestic manufacturers was removed by the Tariff
Act of 1890;9 5 section 7 of the Act precluded imports even by do-
mestic manufacturers. 96 The legislativehistory is unclear as to why
this exception was eliminated. 97 The Act was reenacted in 1894 with
no substantive change, 98 but in 1897 the prohibition on imports was
extended to include goods bearing any mark designed to induce the
public to believe that the goods were of domestic manufacture. 99
Five years later, Congress enacted the Trade-Mark Law of 1905
intending section 27 to regulate the importation of trademarked
goods. 00 Section 27 closely resembled the tariff statutes governing
importation of trademarked goods discussed above.' 0 ' However,
section 27 extended statutory protection to all owners of trademarks
registered with the Patent Office, including distributors and foreign
entities.' 0 2 Hence, after 1905, no goods could be imported into the
United States which carried a trademark registered with the Patent
Office, unless the importer was the trademark registrant and the
trademark was applied only to goods of foreign manufacture.' 0 3
Although the legislative history behind these acts is unclear, 10 4
the underlying theory of trademark law at the turn of the century
centered upon the proposition that trademarks were designed to
represent, at a glance, the source of the goods, i.e., the manufac-
turer.10 5 Known as the source theory, or universalism, 10 6 this prop-
osition may explain why the exception in which the domestic
93 Id. (citing T.D. 899 (1871) (implementing the legislation); T.D. 912 (1871) (regis-
tering trademarks of national and American watch companies); and T.D. 1428 (1873) (rep-
rimanding customs collectors for lack of enforcement)).
94 Id. at 1333 (citing 22 Stat. 488,490 (1883)). The Treasury Department interpreted
the statutory language to prohibit "the importation of articles copying or simulating the
name or trade-mark of any domestic manufacture, unless the domestic manufacturer be
the importer." Id. (citing T.D. 6270 (1884)).
95 Id. at 1334 (citing Tariff Act of 1890, § 7, 26 Stat. 567, 613 (1890)).
96 Id. at 1334.
97 Id.
98 Id. (citing Tariff Act of 1894, § 6, 28 Stat. 547).
99 Id. (citing Tariff Act of 1897, § 4, 30 Stat. 207).
100 Id. (citing Trade-Mark Act of 1907, § 27, 33 Stat. 724, 730 (1905)).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 The goods necessarily would have to be of foreign manufacture. If the registered
trademark were applied to an item of domestic manufacture, there would be no exception
which a domestic trademark registrant could utilize in importing similarly trademarked
goods; the necessary exception was deleted in 1890. See supra notes 92-97 and accompany-
ing text.
104 Lever IV, 981 F.2d at 1334.
105 See, e.g., Daniel M. McClure, Trademark and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of
Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 316-26 (1979).
106 See supra note 18.
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manufacturer imported the goods was left out of the Tariff Act of
1890. Deletion of the exception precluded domestic manufacturers
from selling goods which carried their trademarks, but which were
actually of foreign manufacture. The theory also supports the 1897
amendment prohibiting goods with marks "calculated to induce the
public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United
States." 0 7
Universalism underlies one of the first cases dealing with gray
market goods, '0 8 Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer. l09 In that case, Apollinaris
Company, Ltd., based in London,' acquired the exclusive right to ex-
port and sell in London and the United States Hungarian mineral
water bottled by Andreas Saxlehner, the owner and operator of a
mineral spring. 0 Apollinaris registered its trademark in the United
States, and Apollinaris and Saxlehner agreed to protect Apollinaris'
exclusive rights by labeling all bottles sold elsewhere with the cau-
tionary statement that the bottles were not intended to be sold in
London or the United States."'I Nevertheless, a third party, the de-
fendant Scherer, legally purchased the mineral water from retailers
in Germany, imported it into the United States, and resold it at a
lower price than Apollinaris' sales price.' 12 Accordingly, Apollinaris
sought to enjoin Scherer from importing the trademarked goods.
The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York found in
1886 that trademarks were designed only to indicate the origin of the
products and denied the injunction." 13 The court found that Apol-
linaris would only have equitable redress if there was a breach of
covenant on the part of Saxlehner, remarking "[i]t was not possible
107 Tariff Act of 1897, § 11, 30 Stat. 207.
108 See Lars H. Liebeler, Trademark Law, Economics and Grey Market Policy, 62 IND L.J.
753, 758 (1987) (finding that Apollinaris was the first case to address the parallel import
question); see also Legality of Gray Market Imports, supra note 19, at 1402-03 n.37, and accom-
panying text.
109 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
1 10 Id. at 19.
'1' Id. The label stated, "CAUTION. This bottle is not intended for export, and if
exported for sale in Great Britain, her colonies, America, or other transmarine places, the
public is cautioned against purchasing it. ANDREAS SAXLEHNER." Id. Labels on the
domestic trademark product stated, "Sole exporters. The Apollinaris Company, Limited,
London." Id.
112 Id. Apparently the defendant purchased the trademarked goods from German re-
tailers only after approaching Saxlehner, who refused to sell defendant the mineral water
and informed defendant of Apollinaris' exclusive rights. Id.
113 Id. at 20. The court stated:
[T]he defendant [was] selling the genuine water, and therefore the trade-
mark is not infringed. There is no exclusive right to the use of a name or
symbol or emblematic device except to denote the authenticity of the article
with which it has become identified by association. The name has no office
except to vouch for the genuineness of the thing which it distinguishes from
all counterfeits; and until it is sought to be used as a false token to denote
that the product or commodity to which it is applied is the product or com-
modity which it properly authenticates, the law of trade-mark cannot be in-
voked. Id.
19931
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
by any contract or grant between Saxlehner and the complainant to
create a territorial title to the products of the spring .... The right of
the complainant rest [sic] purely in covenant."' "14
In 1916, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in-
terpreted section 27 of the Trade-Mark Law of 1905 under universal-
ism 1 15 in Fred Gretsch Manufacturing Co. v. Schoening.116 The plaintiff,
Fred Gretsch Manufacturing Company, sought to recover a single
shipment of "Eternelle" violin strings manufactured by C.A. Mueller
of Germany, seized under section 27 by the collector of the Port of
New York.' 1 7 The registered trademark owner in the United States
was Schoening, who contracted with Mueller to be the exclusive
American distributor.'18 Fred Gretsch was considered a third party
importer, so the collector seized the goods because their trademark
copied Schoening's trademark. In affirming the district court's order
to return the violin strings to the plaintiff, the court specifically relied
upon Apollinaris.119 The court noted that Apollinaris was decided
prior to enactment of section 27, but the court found the case unaf-
fected by the statute:
The act prohibits the entry of imported merchandise which shall
'copy or simulate' a trade-mark registered under it. The obvious
purpose is to protect the public and to prevent any one from import-
ing goods identified by their registered trade-mark which are not
genuine. In this case, however, the imported goods were the genu-
ine articles identified by the trade-mark. 120
Employing a literal interpretation of section 27, the court found that
there was no confusion as to the source of the goods, i.e., the Ger-
man manufacturer, and thus no violation of section 27 existed.12'
According to the court, Section 27 would only be violated where the
trademark of the imported goods was applied fraudulently. 122 Con-
sequently, the Treasury Department interpreted the case as allowing
third parties to import goods with an identical trademark to one reg-
istered with the Patent Office only if the registration was intended to
protect a foreign manufacturer's goods and the gray market goods
actually originated from that manufacturer. 123
1'4 Id. at 21.
'15 Legality of Gray Market Imports, supra note 19, at 1403 n.38.
116 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
17 Id. at 780.
118 Id. at 780-81.
119 Id. at 781.
120 Id. at 782.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Lever II, 981 F.2d 1330, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing T.D. 37021, 32 Treas. Dec.
203, 204 (1917)).
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2. The Bourjois Rulings: A Shift Towards Territoriality
a. Judicial Expansion of Trademark Protection
In 1922, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reached a similar result in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel.124 The plaintiff,
A. Bourjois & Company, purchased for a large sum, at arm's length
from the French manufacturer of "Java" face-powder, the right to be
the exclusive distributor of Java in the United States. 12 5 As in Apol-
linaris and Fred Gretsch, a third party found it profitable to purchase
the trademarked goods abroad and import them into the United
States for resale in competition with the exclusive distributor. 126 As
in Apollinaris and Fred Gretsch, the third party imports were not pro-
hibited by the appellate courts. 1 2 7 However, unlike Apollinaris and
Fred Gretsch, the Supreme Court heard the case and reversed the Sec-
ond Circuit.' 2 8 The Court, perJustice Holmes, found that the Amer-
ican public associated Java with Bourjois, the exclusive distributor,
because of large expenditures in advertising: "It is the trademark of
the plaintiff [Bourjois] only in the United States and, it is found, by
public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff
although not made by it."' 129 Hence, sales of the gray market face-
powder would directly affect Bourjois' goodwill, who had no control
over the imports or the quality of the goods. Even though the third
party importation accurately represented the origin of manufacture,
i.e., the goods were genuine, the Court still found that the importa-
tion was an infringement of plaintiff's trademark rights.'
30
By reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court implicitly
broadened trademark theory. The extent to which trademark theory
was expanded is of considerable debate.' 3 1 One rationale cited for
the Court's decision is that the imported gray market goods were
misleading because the public thought the exclusive distributor was
responsible for all the imports. 13 2 Thus, most commentators view
this case as establishing the "territorial" theory of trademarks, i.e.,
the proposition that a trademark can, within a specific area, be attrib-
uted to the distributor's goodwill apart from that of the
124 275 F. 539 (1923).
125 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690 (1923).
126 Id. at 691.
127 Katzel, 275 F. at 539.
128 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 689.
129 Id. at 692.
13o Id. at 691.
131 See, e.g., Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 667, 669 (3d Cir.)
(finding that Katzel has sparked a debate in the courts concerning the breadth of its hold-
ing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
132 See, e.g., Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850,
857-58 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Osawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo, 589 F.
Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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manufacturer. '3 3
However, some commentators have suggested the case be
viewed solely as turning upon the specific equities of the case. 134 Ev-
idence supporting this view includes the Court's failure to acknowl-
edge section 27 of the Trade-Mark Law of 1905 in its opinion,13 5 as
well as Justice Holmes' remarks that Bourjois spent a large amount
of money to be the exclusive distributor and spent large amounts of
money in advertising and promoting its trademark.' 3 6 Since the ex-
clusive distributor could not control the manufacturing process, nor
the quality of the gray market goods produced by the foreign manu-
facturer and imported without consent, according to these commen-
tators, it was unfair to place the exclusive distributor's reputation at
stake.' 3 7 The public would hold the exclusive distributor responsi-
ble for products over which it had no control. These commentators
conclude that the Supreme Court's decision was intended only to
protect a domestic corporation's arm's length purchase from an unre-
lated foreign corporation of an exclusive right to import and sell the
foreign corporation's trademarked product in the United States.' 3 8
Under this construction, Katzel is only an exception to the general
rule of universalism. 13 9
133 See, e.g., supra note 132.
134 See, for example, the district court's treatment of Katzel in Lever 1, 652 F. Supp.
403, 406-07 (D.D.C. 1987). The court felt the Katzel decision was motivated by the fact
that allowing importation was unjust because it would impair the domestic trademark reg-
istrant's goodwill, something that had recently been purchased at arms length negotiations
from the foreign manufacturer. Id. (citing Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 848 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd in part sub non. K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988)). See also Weil, 878 F.2d at 667 and 669 (3d
Cir.) (finding that "most significantly, Bourjois was completely independent from the for-
eign manufacturer," and reading the Bourjois decisions "as creating an exception to the
general application of trademark law in order to protect adequately the interests of domes-
tic trademark holders such as Bourjois"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989); Parfums Stern,
Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416, 419-20 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding
Katzel applicable only where the domestic trademark registrant and foreign trademark
owner are independent and not affiliated).
135 See, e.g., Lever 11, 877 F.2d 101, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding "Holmes' failure to
mention section 27 of the 1905 Act at all . . . leave[s] the case's bearing on section 27
uncertain," but nevertheless, relying on this connection).
136 See, e.g., Weil, 878 F.2d at 667 (finding compelling circumstances in Katzel to be the
complete independence of the foreign and domestic trademark owners and the significant
expense incurred by the domestic trademark owner in securing the exclusive right to im-
port and sell the trademarked goods).
137 See, e.g., Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla.
1983) (finding that the Katzel Court's "underlying reasoning was that the use by the do-
mestic corporation of the trademark bought from the foreign manufacturer ... staked the
reputation of the domestic buyer [of the trademark] on the character of the goods"). See
also 1WVeil, 878 F.2d at 667 (noting that in Katzel, plaintiff "had no control over the goods
that the foreign manufacturer sold abroad which were imported into the United States and
sold with the same mark").
138 Weil, 878 F.2d at 669.
139 See, e.g., id. ("We read [Katzel] as creating an exception to the general application of
trademark law in order to protect adequately the interests of domestic trademark holders
such as Bourjois").
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While Katzel may be viewed as representing a shift in the under-
lying theory of trademark law, the Court did not cite section 27 of
the Trade-Mark Law of 1905 in its holding. It was later that year in
A. BourJois & Co. v. Aldridge,140 a case with facts similar to Katzel, that a
weak connection was drawn between the holding in Katzel and sec-
tion 27.141 In Aldridge, Bourjois, the same plaintiff as in Katzel,
sought injunctive relief against Customs to enjoin it from allowing
third parties to import face-powder associated with the trademark
"Manon Lescaut."' 142 The Second Circuit certified two questions to
the Supreme Court: first, whether the exclusive rights purchased by
the American corporation to manufacture and sell the foreign manu-
facturer's goods in the United States would support an infringement
action against third parties importing the foreign goods; and second,
whether section 27 required Customs to bar the imports. 143 Specifi-
cally noting that Customs did not present any opposing arguments,
the Supreme Court relied upon Katzel in answering both questions
affirmatively. 144 Thus, it is Aldridge which proponents of territoriality
cite as explicitly incorporating territoriality into section 27 of the
Trade-Mark Law of 1905, and consequently, section 42 of the Lan-
ham Act.
b. Congressional Expansion of Trademark Protection
Prior to the Supreme Court's reversal of the Second Circuit's
decision in Katzel, Congress felt compelled to override the Second
Circuit's decision by enacting section 526 of the 1922 Tariff Act,
later to become section 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act."45 The legisla-
tion was quickly composed and passed with little debate upon the
floor, 1 4 6 and commentators believe it represented a hasty response
to a misunderstanding of the facts of Katzel."47 However, other com-
mentators have found that section 526 should not be construed so
140 263 U.S. 675 (1923)(per curiam).
141 See, e.g., Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1986)
(finding that a connection between the Bourois rulings and section 27 "puts a great deal of
strain on a one-sentence per curiam opinion [Aldridge] announcing a decision, to which the
opposing party did not object, based on the reasoning of the three-page opinion in [Kat-
zel]"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
142 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 292 F. 1013, 1013 (2d Cir. 1922).
14 Id. at 1014.
144 Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 675 ("The two questions certified ... are answered in the
affirmative upon the authority of [Katzell, the defendant not objecting").
145 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 300-302 (1988) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). See also In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q.
823, 832 (ITC) (finding that section 526 was "intended to apply only in a situation where a
foreign owner of trademark rights has sold those rights to an American company), disap-
proved by 225 U.S.P.Q 862 (Pres U.S.), appeal dismissed, Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1985). For text of section 526(a) see supra note 16.
146 K Mart, 486 U.S. at 303, 304.
147 Id. at 304.
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narrowly. 148 As in the debate over interpreting the Supreme Court's
decision in Katzel and Aldridge, these commentators find recognition
of territoriality in section 526.' 4 9 In any event, it is important to
note that Congress implicitly resurrected in section 526(a) the excep-
tion of allowing imports bearing registered trademarks by a domestic
registrant upon the registrant's consent, the exception which was im-
plicitly deleted by section 7 of the 1890 Tariff Act.15 0
B. Implementation of the Federal Statutory Trademark Law in Light
of the Bourjois Rulings
1. Evolution of Customs Regulations Section 133.21
In 1936, in an attempt to implement section 27 of the Trade-
Mark Law of 1905 in light of the Bourjois rulings, 15 1 as well as section
526(a) of the 1930 Tariff Act, the Treasury Department promulgated
regulations explicitly allowing, for the first time since 1890, an ex-
ception to the proscription on imports covered by section 27.152
Section 518(b) of the 1936 regulations lifted the prohibition on im-
ports of goods bearing a trademark valid in a foreign country if the
trademark was identical to one protected in the United States and
the foreign and domestic trademark owners were "the same person,
partnership, association, or corporation."'' 5 3 No explanation of the
148 See, e.g., Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903 (1986), rev'd in part sub noma. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281 (1988). For a contemporaneous view on the notion that section 526(a) would not
have been enacted but for the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel, see Sturges v. Clark D.
Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1036 (2d Cir. 1931) (finding Katzel, although the stimulus to
enacting section 526(a), is not determinative of the scope of section 526(a)). For the view
that section 526(a) should not be limited to the facts of Katzel, and furthermore, should not
be limited to cases of trademark infringement, like section 42 of the Lanham Act, see
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1055 (1986).
149 See, e.g., Coalition, 790 F.2d at 910 (finding section 526(a) "enshrined the... 'terri-
toriality' approach into law"); In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823 (ITC)
(views of Vice Chairman Liebeler) (finding that to view section 526(a) as strictly overruling
the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel "mandates a narrow interpretation of section
526(a) rest[ing] far too much on the fact of who owns the trademark"), disapproved by 225
U.S.P.Q. 862 (Pres U.S.), appeal dismissed, Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Osawa Co. v. B. & H. Photo, 589 F. Supp. 463, 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding no
reason not to enforce section 526(a) to the fullest extent of its plain meaning, which
reaches beyond Katzel situations).
150 See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
151 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
152 Id. (citing T.D. 48537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936)).
153 Id. This exception is the precursor of the affiliate exception. Id. Section 518(b)
provides, in relevant part:
[M]erchandise manufactured or sold in a foreign country under a trade-mark
or trade name, which trade-mark is registered and recorded, or which trade
name is recorded under the trade-mark laws of the United States, shall not be
deemed for the purposes of these regulations to copy or simulate such
United States trade-mark or trade name if such foreign trade-mark or trade
name and such United States trade-mark or trade name are owned by the
same person, partnership, association, or corporation.
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exception was offered.' 54 However, the exception does appear to
emphasize the universality theory of trademarks and deemphasize
the territoriality theory, for it precludes the expansion of the Aidridge
decision to cases where the domestic and foreign trademark owners
are not completely independent of each other.' 55
In the early 1940's, Congress considered wholesale revisions of
the federal statutory trademark laws and eventually enacted the Lan-
ham Trade-Mark Act of 1946.156 Section 42 of the Act substantially
mirrors section 27 of the Trade-Mark Law of 1905, and commenta-
tors have found it provides substantially the same protection to
trademark holders. 157  In fact, the Treasury Department imple-
mented section 42 in the same manner as section 27, until 1953,
when it explicitly broadened the "same person" exception to include
"related companies" and companies subject to "common con-
trol."' 5 8 Several attempts were made in Congress to enact this ex-
ception into law, but all attempts failed, 159 and in 1959, the
exception was abandoned by the Treasury Department as inconsis-
tent with section 42.160 Nevertheless, there is evidence that Customs
continued to apply the exception after repeal, 16' and in 1972, Cus-
T.D. 48537 (1936).
154 Lever IV, 981 F.2d at 1335.
155 The same person, partnership, association, or corporation exception, later ex-
panded to include companies subject to common control, essentially allows gray market
imports in all situations except where the domestic and foreign trademark owners are in-
dependent. Thus, while the Bourjois decisions conceivably could have been expanded by
creative lawyering, thereby causing a complete shift in trademark law to territoriality, the
exceptions promulgated actually confine any such expansion, making the Bourjois decisions
the exception.
156 Lever IV, 981 F.2d at 1335.
157 See, e.g., Lever 11, 877 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding section 42 of the
Lanham Act substantially the same as section 27 of the 1905 Act); Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1565 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding section 27 of the Trade-Mark
Law of 1905 was intended to be carried forward in section 42 of the Lanham Act), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823, 833 (ITC)
(finding that by reenacting the same words in section 27 into section 42, Congress in-
tended administrative implementation of section 27 and judicial interpretation of section
27 to be incorporated into section 42), disapproved by 225 U.S.P.Q. 862 (Pres U.S. 1985),
appeal dismissed, Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
158 Lever IV, 981 F.2d at 1336 (citing T.D. 53399, 18 Fed. Reg. 8685, 8688 (Dec. 24,
1953)).
159 See id. (citing H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 11453, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1956) (adding "common control" and "related company" exceptions to section 42;
never reported out of committee); H.R. 9476, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H.R. 2540, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); Hearing on H.R. 9476 Before Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1954) (removing Treasury's affiliate exception proposal by unanimous consent)).
160 Id. (citing T.D. 54932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433 (1959)). But see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 311 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that the Treasury repealed the common control and related companies exception
for reasons not relevant in considering the validity of the exceptions against a section
526(a) attack).
161 See, e.g., K Mart, 486 U.S. at 311-12 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, found that the Treasury
Department and Customs continuously applied the repealed exceptions as if they had
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toms promulgated the current affiliate exception found in section
133.21(c)(2). 162 Once again, no explanation was offered for the ex-
ception in either the notice of proposal of the rule or the notice of
the final rule's adoption. 163
2. Recent Decisions Interpreting the Effect of Section 133.21
When gray market goods became an increasing problem for
trademark owners beginning in the early 1980's, the affiliate excep-
tion came under attack as an invalid exercise of administrative
power. Trademark owners claimed that Customs was required to ex-
clude gray market goods imported by third parties, but purchased
abroad from an affiliated corporation, unless the domestic trademark
owners consented to the importation. Challenges to the regulations
were based most often upon section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930,
and occasionally on sections 32 and 42 of the Lanham Act.164
In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed
this issue in Vivitar Corp. v. United States.165 The court found that
Customs' administrative practice was inconsistent and that the legis-
lative intent behind section 526(a) precluded a narrowing of the stat-
ute by section 133.21.166 However, the court upheld the regulations
as a permissive exercise of administrative enforcement discretion. 167
If the domestic trademark owner could successfully bring an in-
fringement action against the third party importer, the court inti-
never been repealed. Id. For support, he cited 3 Cust. B. & Dec. 17 (1969), for the propo-
sition that importation of gray market goods was permitted in practice where "the foreign
producer is the parent or subsidiary of the American [trademark] owner or the firms are
under a common control." Id. He also cited Letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner
Flinn to Felix Levitan (Mar. 15, 1963) (articulating that Customs' "position for many
years" was to allow gray market imports where the "merchandise [is] manufactured or sold
by the foreign parent or subsidiary corporation of an American trademark owner"). Id.
See also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420, 432 (1984) (conducting an exten-
sive review of Customs' practice and concluding it has remained consistent since 1936),
aff'd 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (disagreeing with the finding of consistent practice),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). But see John F. Atwood, Import Restriction on Trademarked
Merchandise-The Role of the United States Customs Service, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1969) (find-
ing Customs' practice inconsistent during the 1950's and 1960's).
162 See 37 Fed. Reg. 20677 (1972). The affiliate exception is now found in 19 C.F.R.
§ 133.21(c)(2) (1988).
163 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1336-1337 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing 35 Fed. Reg. 19269(1970) (proposing the affiliate exception), and 6 Cust. B. & Dec. 538 (1972) (adopting
affiliate exception)).
164 See Rian Miller-Mclrvine, Note, Trademark Law-Gray Market Goods in Domestic Markets-
Lever Bros. v. United States, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 189, 195 (1990). Prior to the Court's decision
in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1988), trademark owners favored section 526(a)
over sections in the Lanham Act because of broader language found in section 526(a). See,
e.g., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding section
42, but not section 526(a), limited to infringement cases, and thus, section 526(a) encom-
passing the protection afforded by section 42), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
165 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
166 Id. at 1565.
167 Id. at 1569.
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mated that the domestic trademark owner then could enjoin
Customs from allowing the infringing goods passage into the United
States. 168 One year later the Second Circuit addressed the issue
against both a section 526(a) claim and a section 42 claim in Olympus
Corp. v. United States. 169 The court expressly adopted the findings of
the Vivitar court concerning the legislative intent of section 526(a) 170
and agreed with the Vivitar court that section 133.21(c)(2) did not
define the scope of section 526(a).171 However, the court felt that
Customs' practice was consistent and upheld section 133.21(c)(2)
based upon Congressional acquiescence in the administrative prac-
tice. 172 The court noted that Congress knew of the affiliate excep-
tion but had not affirmatively acted to prohibit its application.
In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also
considered the validity of the affiliate exception against a section
526(a) claim in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
United States.' 73 According to the court, the legislative intent clearly
precluded application of the affiliate exception. 174 Furthermore, the
court noted that Customs itself viewed section 133.21 as interpreting
the scope of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and section 42
of the Lanham Act, and thus the court rejected the contention that
section 133.21(c)(2) was merely a guideline for administrative
enforcement. ' 7 5
The D.C. Circuit's decision resulted in the famous 1988
Supreme Court case of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 176 In K Mart, the
Court reversed the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal's finding that the
affiliate exception was inconsistent with section 526(a). The Court
divided gray market cases into three situations, the second of which
involves application of the affiliate exception. 77 The second situa-
168 Id. at 1569-70.
169 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
170 Id. at 319. The court actually added one more finding of fact to the Vivitar court's
findings, that Customs has issued several letters reflecting its consistent policy of practic-
ing an affiliate exception. Id. (citing Customs Service Letters dated Mar. 23, 195 1;July 2,
1962; Mar. 19, 1963; Dec. 11, 1968; and June 28, 1971).
171 Id. at 320 (finding "Customs' interpretation of the statute does not limit the reach
of protection of section 526).
172 Id. (finding that the affiliate exception is of questionable wisdom, but nevertheless,
that "congressional acquiescence in the longstanding administrative interpretation of the
statute legitimates that interpretation as an exercise of Customs' enforcement discretion").
Id.
173 790 F.2d 903 (1986), rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281 (1988).
174 Id. at 908 (finding "Congress' intent in Section 526 is clear, and thus 'that is the
end of the matter' "); id. at 913 (finding "Congress' intent on the issue at hand is
apparent").
175 Id. at 918 (finding that Customs regarded section 133.21(c)(2) as "what the law
requires rather than as a decision not to prosecute to the letter of the law").
176 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
177 Id. at 286-87. Case 1 involves situations where the registered trademark owner has
purchased from a foreign trademark owner the rights to be the exclusive distributor or
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tion, termed by the Court "Case 2," is subdivided into three parts:
Case 2a, where the domestic trademark registrant is a domestic sub-
sidiary of the foreign trademark owner; Case 2b, where the domestic
trademark registrant is the parent of the foreign trademark owner;
and Case 2c, where the domestic trademark registrant is the owner of
a foreign division manufacturing and applying the trademark.' 78 A
divided Court upheld the affiliate exception in Cases 2b and 2c; a
unanimous Court upheld the exception in Case 2a. 179 In upholding
the exception in Case 2a, a majority of the Court found the language
"owns by" in the statute to entail sufficient ambiguity to permit Cus-
toms' interpretation that a foreign parent corporation could be
deemed to own the trademark of a subsidiary located in the Untied
States.' 80 The majority's holding was based upon a technical inter-
pretation of the statute and addressed neither policy concerns nor
the underlying legislative intent of section 526(a). While Justice
Brennan, in a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, agreed with the others to unanimously uphold
the affiliate exception in Case 2a situations, in a separate opinion he
attempted to resolve the policy concerns and underlying legislative
intent behind section 526(a).' 8 ' Furthermore, the Court limited its
decision by specifically declining to address the validity of the excep-
tion against a section 42 claim.' 82 However, the Court did not qual-
ify its decision as a judgment of the reasonableness of Customs'
regulations in the context of administrative enforcement discretion,
and the likely implication was that the regulations actually define the
scope of both section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and section 42
of the Lanham Act.' 83
manufacturer, and the foreign trademarked goods are imported in direct competition
against the domestic trademark owner by either the foreign trademark owner or unrelated
third parties. Id. Case 1 is the prototypical gray market scenario demanding the most
trademark protection, and is representative of cases like A. Bourois & Co. v. Katzel, 260
U.S. 689 (1923), and A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 265 (1923). Id. at 300-01
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Case 3 situations arise where the
domestic trademark registrant licenses use of its trademark to a foreign corporation and
the foreign trademarked goods are imported in direct competition with the domestic
trademark registrant by the foreign corporation or by unrelated third parties. Id. at 287.
178 Id. at 286-87.
179 justices Kennedy, White, Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall upheld section
133.21 (c)(2) in Case 2b and Case 2c situations, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Blackmun dissenting. Id. at 286-287.
180 Id. at 292 (Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice White); id. at 318 (Justice Scalia,
joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Blackmun, concurring as to the validity of
section 133.21(c)(2) only in Case 2a situations).
181 K Mart, 486 U.S. at 295. See infra notes 305-12 and accompanying text.
182 K Mart, 486 U.S. at 290 n.3.
183 See, e.g., Thomas A. Smart, Squaring the Gray Goods Circle, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1963,
1977 (1989).
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C. Recent Decisions Interpreting the Scope of Section 42 of the
Lanham Act
When the affiliate exception is viewed as defining the relative
reach of section 42, the issue becomes whether the goods in question
can "copy or simulate" the registered trademark in the United States
when there is an affiliate relationship between the foreign and do-
mestic trademark owners. In defining "copy or simulate," the courts
have looked to the common understanding of the words, 184 to the
underlying intent of the statute, 85 and to principles of trademark
law in general. 186 However, the results have been mixed.
1. Reliance Upon Territoriality: A Broad Reading of the
Bourjois Rulings
a. Infringement Resulting from Material Differences Between
the Domestic and Gray Market Goods
In a line of cases considering genuine gray market goods that
materially differ from corresponding domestic goods, the courts
have concluded that section 32 of the Lanham Act bars the gray mar-
ket imports.' 87 These cases are noteworthy because courts have
found a great similarity between section 32 and section 42 of the
Lanham Act. ' 88
One such case is Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Co., in which the
184 Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
853, 671 (1989); In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823, 244 (ITC), disapproved
by 225 U.S.P.Q. 862 (Pres U.S.), appeal dismissed, Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
185 See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 638-639
(1st Cir. 1992); IVeil, 878 F.2d at 672-73.
186 See, e.g., NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc., 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.), cert.denied,
484 U.S. 851 (1987); Original Appalachian Artworks v. Granada Electronics, 816 F.2d 68
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951
(S.D. Fla. 1986).
187 These cases include Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Co., see infra notes 189-195
and accompanying text; Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., see infra notes 196-200 and accompa-
nying text; Original Appalachians Art Works Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., see infra
notes 201-211 and accompanying text.
188 See e.g., In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823, 850 (ITC) (Views of
Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner Rohr) ("While the language of section 32 is
broader, it clearly contains within it section 42's concept of 'copy or simulate' "), disap-
proved by 225 U.S.P.Q. 862 (Pres U.S.), appeal dismissed, Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578
(Fed. Cir. 1985). Section 32 of the Lanham Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides, in
relevant part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant . . . use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered trademark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribu-
tion, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ...
shall be liable . . . for the remedies hereinafter provided. (emphasis added).
Section 42 is less encompassing than section 32, as it only prohibits trademarks which
"copy or simulate", but it is less burdensome to prove a violation of section 42, as section
42 does not require proof of a likelihood of confusion. In any event, section 42 appears to
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District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted an injunc-
tion under section 32 to prohibit defendant from selling Trivial Pur-
suit games imported from Canada.' 89 The plaintiff acquired the
exclusive right to manufacture and sell Trivial Pursuit games in the
United States from the Canadian manufacturer.190 The defendant
was purchasing the Canadian games from Canadian retailers and im-
porting them into the United States.' 9 ' Differences between the Ca-
nadian and the American games included: the absence of plaintiff's
logo on the outside of the imported games; the absence of its
brochure inside; and the deletion of several "unsuitable" questions
found in the Canadian games.' 9 2 Relying on the principle of territo-
riality, the court found that the differences in the Trivial Pursuit
games would lead to irreparable harm to the domestic trademark
owner because the trademark was associated in the United States
with its goodwill.' 9 3 The court thus found statutory trademark in-
fringement under section 32 of the Lanham Act, since the trademark
of the gray market goods would likely be confused with the trade-
mark of the domestic owner.19 4 The court discounted defendant's
argument that a domestic trademark owner cannot prevent the im-
portation of gray market goods, for the court found that the facts of
the case fell "squarely within the principles of Bourjois and its prog-
eny," regardless of whether Katzel is an exception or the norm.' 95
The court reached a similar conclusion a year later in Dial Corp.
v. Encina Corp. 196 The plaintiff, Dial Corporation, was the registered
trademark owner which manufactured and sold Dial soap in the
United States. 197 The defendant purchased Dial from a foreign li-
censee of the plaintiff and imported the soap into the United States
in competition with the domestic product.198 Because the imported
Dial contained different ingredients, different fragrances, and differ-
be applicable to a special subset of claims under section 32, i.e., those involving imported
goods bearing trademarks that copy domestic trademarks.
189 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
190 Id. at 21.
191 Id. at 22-23.
192 Id. at 21-22.
193 Id. at 28 (finding that the "principle of territoriality plays an important part in the
case," and that "[glames imported from Canada can irreparably damage S & R's image
and reputation, since United States consumers associate the 'Trivial Pursuit' trademark
with S & R"). Id.
194 Id. at 23-24.
195 Id. at 29. Essentially, since the facts so closely resembled those in Katzel and Al-
dridge, the court was not forced to decide whether the Boujois rulings represented a broad
principle of territoriality or an exception to universalism. The court discounted one of its
previous decisions supporting the affiliate exception, Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States,
see infra notes 250-56 and accompanying text, because of Selchow & Righter's indepen-
dence from the foreign manufacturer. Selchow & Righter Co., 612 F.Supp. at 29.
196 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
197 Id. at 952.
198 Id.
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ent labeling not conforming to FDA regulations, the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida found the sale of such goods
could lead to consumer confusion resulting in an impairment of
plaintiff's goodwill. 199 Stressing that under the territorial principle,
the plaintiff could prohibit importation of gray market goods under
section 32 if goodwill established in the trademark was sufficiently
impaired through consumer confusion resulting from material differ-
ences in the goods, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's section 32 claim.200
A similar case is Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elec-
tronics, Inc., decided in 1987.201 The plaintiff, Original Appalachian
Artworks, was the registered trademark owner of Cabbage Patch
Kids dolls in the United States. 20 2 Jesmar, S.A., was a licensed man-
ufacturer of the dolls in Spain.20 3 Under the terms of the license, the
"Spanish Kids" were not to be imported for sale in the United
States, nor to be sold to distributors importing the dolls into the
United States.20 4 Nevertheless, the defendant still managed to
purchase and import the Spanish Kids. 205 The material difference in
the products concerned the simulated adoption procedures in which
the buyers of the United States dolls could participate, a difference
the court found to be "a very real difference in the product itself."20 6
Upon purchase of the domestic dolls, the buyer received adoption
papers, a birth certificate, and a postcard which could be filled out
and mailed to a United States service center. 20 7 One year later, the
buyer's doll would receive a birthday card.20 8 Similar documents
also accompanied the Spanish Kids, but because they were written in
Spanish, the United States service center was either unable or unwill-
ing to process the Spanish Kids' papers.20 9 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit devoted little discussion to defendant's con-
199 Id.
200 Id. at 954. In this case, although not explicitly so stating, the court appears to
discount the universalism principle found in Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States, see infra
notes 250-56 and accompanying text, by limiting its holding in Parfums Stern, Inc. to where
there is an affiliated relationship and where there is "no showing that the public would be
harmed.., by the importation of [the] ... 'grey market' goods." Dial Corp., 643 F. Supp.
at 954-55 (quoting Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D. Fla.
1983)).
201 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987).
202 Id. at 70.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 73. Judge Cardamone, in concurrence, found the importation of the physi-
cally identical gray market goods, due to the material difference in service performed by
the United States processing center, constituted, in an abstract sense, a materially physical
alteration in the gray market goods. Id. at 76 (Judge Cardamone, concurring).
207 Id. at 70.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 73.
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tention that plaintiff could not be damaged by his own goods,, and
found the fact that a single entity owned the worldwide trademark
not dispositive. 210 The court felt compelled to prevent any possible
consumer confusion arising from the sale of the two materially differ-
ent goods, and therefore found that the Spanish trademark infringed
the United States trademark under section 32.211
Finally, on December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit in Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc.
granted an injunction against the importation of gray market goods
bought from a licensee abroad. 212 While finding a violation of sec-
tion 32, the court also found a violation of section 42, relying heavily
upon the D.C. District Court's decision on remand in Lever.2 13 In
Nestle, trademarked Italian chocolates, Perugina, were owned world-
wide by Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. (Nestle).2 14 In 1988, Nes-
tle granted to an affiliated corporation, Nestle Puerto Rico, Inc., the
right to be the exclusive distributor in Puerto Rico, replacing Casa
Helvetia, Inc. 2 15 However, Casa Helvetia continued to sell Perugina
chocolates in Puerto Rico by purchasing them from a licensed manu-
facturer of Perugina chocolates in Venezuela and importing them
into Puerto Rico. 216 The Court found that the Venezuela chocolates
materially differed from Nestle Puerto Rico's chocolates in ingredi-
ents and product packaging. 2 17 The court also found that the two
products materially differed in quality. 2 18 Because of these distinc-
tions, the First Circuit found that "an unauthorized importation may
well turn an otherwise 'genuine' product into a 'counterfeit' one. ' 219
Hence, the importation of the chocolates from Venezuela consti-
tuted a violation of section 42.220 The issue of the affiliate excep-
tion's validity did not arise in the case.2 2'
210 Id. at 73.
211 Id. at 74.
212 982 F.2d 633, 644 (1st Cir. 1992).
213 Id. Furthermore, the court found a violation of section 43, designed to prevent
false designations of origin by trademarks, i.e., the origin not only of source, but also
sponsorship and affiliation. Id. As the court remarked concerning sections 32, 42, and 43
of the Lanham Act, "all roads lead to Rome." Id.
214 Id. at 635. The court cited Lever III for the proposition that since "the potential for
consumer confusion is extremely high when a product catering to the indigenous condi-
tions of a foreign country competes domestically against a physically different product that
bears the same name," then "the foreign product can legitimately be said to 'copy or simu-
late' the domestic mark because use of the identical nomenclature 'is simply not truth-
ful.' " Id. (citing Lever I11, 877 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
215 NVestle, 982 F.2d at 635.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 643.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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b. Infringment Resulting from Consumer Confusion over
Sponsorship of the Gray Market Goods
Some courts have relied upon the territorial principle of trade-
marks in finding that a genuine gray market good's trademark can
infringe the corresponding domestic good's trademark if there is
confusion over the sponsorship of the gray market goods in the do-
mestic market.222 The underlying proposition of these decisions is
that trademarks may embody the goodwill of not only the manufac-
turer, but also the distributor who promotes and enhances the trade-
marked goods in a particular area.2 23 Technically, the definition of
the "source of origin" of the goods is expanded to include members
in the distribution chain, i.e., the manufacturer, distributor and re-
tailer.2 24 These decisions cite the Bourjois rulings as representative
of the general protection that should be afforded a domestic trade-
mark owner's goodwill. 22 5
In 1984, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York relied upon this interpretation of the territorial principle in
Osawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo, where it found that trademarks of non-
differing gray market goods may copy the trademarks of correspond-
ing domestic goods.226 In Osawa, the court was asked to restrain the
defendants from selling high-quality photographic equipment manu-
factured by Mamiya in Japan and sold to them by gray market im-
porters. 227  The plaintiff, Osawa, contracted with its parent
corporation, J. Osawa & Co., Ltd., to be the exclusive distributor in
the United States; J. Osawa & Co., Ltd., in turn, contracted with
Mamiya to be the exclusive worldwide distributor of its products. 228
When third parties began purchasing Mamiya's products abroad and
importing them for resell at substantially cheaper prices in the
United States, Osawa successfully brought suit against the gray mar-
ket retailers for injunctive relief; the court found a violation of sec-
tion 526(a) of the 1930 Tariff Act, 229 as well as infringement under
222 These cases include Osawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo, see infra notes 226-32 and
accompanying text; In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, see infra notes 233-42 and accompany-
ing text; and Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., see infra notes 243-
247 and accompanying text.
223 See supra note 222.
224 In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823, 835 (ITC) (" 'source of origin'
does not mean only manufacturer, but also the distribution chain"), disapproved by 225
U.S.P.Q. 862 (Pres U.S.), appeal dismissed, Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. Corp., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1069-70
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that "origin" denotes not only the manufacturer, but any "party
responsible for exercising judgment respecting the quality of goods it distributes to the
public").
225 See, e.g., supra note 132.
226 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
227 Id. at 1165.
228 Id. at 1164-65.
229 Id. at 1179.
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section 32 of the Lanham Act.2 30 The Second Circuit affirmed the
injunction based upon the irreparable injury sustained by Osawa in
lost sales, slashed advertising budgets, extension of its warranty for
free service of the domestic products to the gray goods, retailer dis-
satisfaction, and appearance of price gouging.23' Since Customs ad-
mitted the gray market goods without exception, and because the
defendants did not properly raise the affiliate exception as a defense,
the Osawa court did not contemplate the affiliate exception in reach-
ing its decision s232
In 1985, the International Trade Commission (ITC) also sub-
scribed to this interpretation of "copy" in In re Certain Alkaline Batter-
ies.2 33 Even though the foreign and domestic trademark owners were
affiliated through a corporate parent, the ITC found under section
42 that a foreign trademark copied its affiliated United States trade-
mark upon entry into the United States.23 4 The gray market imports
at issue in the case were AA, AAA, C, D, and nine volt Duracell bat-
teries manufactured by N.V. Duracell S.A. (Duracell Belgium) in
Belgium for sale in Europe.2 35 An unrelated third party was import-
ing the European Duracell batteries into the United States in direct
competition with the domestic Duracell batteries.23 6 Duracell
U.S.A., an unincorporated division of Duracell Inc., manufactured
the domestic batteries; furthermore, Duracell, Inc., wholly owned
Duracell International, Inc., which, in turn, wholly owned Duracell
Belgium. 237 The Commission found that the Belgian batteries,
though genuine in Europe, copied the American version upon entry
into the United States.238 The ITC thought that it was irrelevant the
batteries were physically identical and that the foreign manufacturer
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the United States corporation
which wholly-owned the manufacturer of the domestic batteries. 239
Acknowledging that a thing cannot copy itself, the ITC rejected its
common understanding of "copy." '240 Instead, the ITC adhered to
the view that the principle of territoriality can establish two distinct
trademarks, although the goods are physically identical.24' Reason-
ing that the American consumer who purchased the batteries would
230 Id. at 1173.
231 Id. at 1168-69.
232 Id. at 1177.
233 225 U.S.P.Q. 823 (ITC), disapproved by 225 U.S.P.Q. 862 (Pres U.S.), appeal dis-
missed, Duracell, Inc. v. ITC, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
234 Id. at 833 (finding "when the batteries are imported and sold in the United States,
the Belgian trademark becomes a copy of the U.S. trademark").
235 Id. at 825.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 833.
239 Id.
240 See id. at 851-52 (views of Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner Rohr).
241 Id.
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believe they were manufactured and marketed by Duracell U.S.A.,
the ITC based infringement upon confusion over the sponsorship of
the goods.242
Protection of the domestic trademark owner's goodwill was rec-
ognized by the Third Circuit in Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby
Dental Supply Co., although relief was based upon section 526(a) of
the 1930 Tariff Act. 243 The plaintiff was the exclusive distributor of
"Impregum" trademarked goods manufactured in West Ger-
many. 244 The defendant was purchasing and importing for sale Eu-
ropean "Impregum" trademarked goods identical to the domestic
goods. 245 The court relied upon the fact that plaintiff was the exclu-
sive distributor for over ten years, expended large investments in ad-
vertising and promoting its trademarked goods, and guaranteed
consumer satisfaction. 246 It found that the Impregum trademark was
associated with plaintiff's goodwill and enjoined the defendant from
importing and reselling the identical gray market goods. 247 Even
though the court did not explicitly embrace the territorial principle,
it recognized that trademarks can carry distinct goodwill in one
country as opposed to another country when the domestic trademark
holder is the exclusive distributor and has promoted and has en-
hanced the trademark.
2. Reliance Upon Universalism: A Narrow Reading of the
Bourjois Rulings
The above cases relied upon the territorial principle in finding
that a gray market good's trademark can copy a registered trademark
and thus be a violation of sections 32 and 42 of the Lanham Act.
Other cases have rejected the territorial principle and its implica-
tions. 248 These courts have interpreted the Bourjois rulings to repre-
sent an exception to universalism; consequently, they have found
that genuine gray market goods generally cannot infringe upon cor-
responding domestic goods. 2 49
An often cited case for this proposition is Parfums Stern, Inc. v.
United States,250 decided by the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida in 1983. The plaintiff was a member of an interna-
tional family which owned the trademark and manufactured and
242 Id. at 836.
243 794 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
244 Id. at 851.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 855.
247 Id. at 858.
248 Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States, see infra notes 250-56 and accompanying text,
Olympus Corp. v. United States, see infra notes 257-61 and accompanying text, and Weil
Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, see infra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 248.
250 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
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distributed Oscar De La Renta products throughout the world. 2 5'
Consequently, the plaintiff contributed substantial time and money
in promoting its trademark. 252 Third parties were importing Oscar
De La Renta products into the United States, and plaintiff sought an
injunction under section 32 and 42 of the Lanham Act. 253 The court
denied relief and distinguished Katzel and Aldridge as limited to their
specific facts. 254 The court remarked that a plaintiff under the facts
of the case could not seek "protection of trademark laws to insulate
itself from what it placed in motion itself through its own foreign
manufacturing and distribution sources. '255 While noting that the
public would not be harmed by confusion over the domestic and gray
goods,256 the court based its ruling on the foreign and domestic
trademark owners' affiliated relationship.
In Olympus Corp. v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in 1985 considered the meaning of "copy or simulate"
with respect to section 42 of the Lanham Act. 2 57 The plaintiff, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the foreign manufacturer and the regis-
tered trademark owner in the United States, sued for injunctive relief
restraining 47th Street Photo and K Mart from purchasing and sell-
ing gray market Olympus products.258 The court denied relief, find-
ing that section 42 was generally restricted to trademarks that were
counterfeit or spurious.2 59 The court recognized that the Bourjois
rulings represented an exception in which genuine gray market
goods could copy or simulate the domestic goods, but the court lim-
ited the two cases to their specific facts. 260 The court relied upon a
Supreme Court suggestion to so limit the Bourjois rulings:
A trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to
protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product
as his .... There is nothing to the contrary in [Katzel] .... There the
trade-mark protected indicated that the goods came from the plaintiff
in the United States, although not made by it, and therefore could not
be put upon other goods of the same make coming from abroad. 26 1
251 Id. at 418.
252 Id. at 419.
253 See id. at 419-20.
254 Id. at 419.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 421.
257 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
258 Id. at 317.
259 Id. at 321.
260 Id. at 321-22.
261 Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (emphasis added). The debate over
whether the Bourjois rulings should be narrowly interpreted can be reduced to defining
"plaintiff in the United States" from this excerpt of the Court's opinion. If this phrase is
merely descriptive, then an affiliated foreign corporation could be viewed as standing in
the domestic trademark holder's shoes, and vice-versa, because of the affiliated relation-
ship. This would lead to a narrowing of the two cases and validation of the affiliate excep-
tion. However, if this phrase is interpreted literally, a foreign affiliate would not physically
be in the United States. Hence, the Boutjois rulings would be broadly interpreted to fore-
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Since the domestic trademark owner in Katzel was independent from
the foreign trademark owner, the gray market goods could not be
viewed as originating with the domestic trademark owner; however,
if affiliated, the foreign trademark owner could be viewed as one with
the domestic trademark owner in interpreting "plaintiff in the United
States."
Following Olympus, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found, in NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco, that genuine gray market
goods cannot give rise to infringement claims under section 32 of
the Lanham Act. 26 2 The plaintiff, a domestic corporation and a
wholly-owned subsidiary of NEC Electronics of Japan, was the regis-
tered trademark owner of "NEC" computer chips in the United
States, and while the plaintiff manufactured ten percent of the com-
puter chips it sold under the NEC trademark, it imported ninety per-
cent of the chips from its foreign parent. 263 The defendants
purchased NEC's computer chips abroad and imported them for sale
in the United States. 264 In overturning the district court's injunc-
tion, the appellate court distinguished Katzel, as did the Olympus
court, by finding that the registered trademark owner was not in-
dependent of the foreign trademark manufacturer. 265 The court rec-
ognized the inequity in Katzel arising from the fact that the registered
trademark owner did not have control over the quality and manufac-
turing of the gray market goods and felt that the holding should be
limited to the specific facts found in Katzel when considering sections
32 and 42 claims. 266
One of the most recent cases subscribing to this interpretation,
and handed down one year after the Supreme Court's decision in K
Mart, is Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash. 267 In Weil, the plaintiff
was the registered trademark owner in the United States of Lladro
porcelain; the plaintiff also was the wholly-owned subsidiary of
Lladro Exportadora, S.A., a sister corporation to Lladro, S.A., the
manufacturer of Lladro porcelain. 268 Because of third party impor-
tations of Lladro porcelain purchased abroad, the plaintiff claimed
to sustain impairment of its goodwill as well as lost sales, and sought
injunctive relief under section 42, among other claims. 269 The Court
close the affiliate exception. The issue thus reduces, in view of K Mart, to whether there is
sufficient ambiguity in the phrase so as to allow Customs interpretation admitting of an
affiliate exception. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
262 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987).
263 Id. at 1507.
264 Id. at 1507-08.
265 Id. at 1510.
266 Id. at 1510.
267 878 F.2d 659, 662 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
268 Id.
269 Id. Other claims were based upon sections 32 and 33 of the Lanham Act, and
section 526(a) of the 1930 Tariff Act. Id.
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied relief. Limiting Katzel and
Aldridge to their specific facts, and rejecting the territorial principle,
the court held that section 42 was not intended to apply to genuine
goods. 270 The court adopted the common understanding of "copy
or simulate" as referring to items which "resemble, but are not
themselves, the original or genuine artifacts." 271 Hence, the court
found that section 42 was generally only available to protect the do-
mestic trademark owner from importation of like goods with similar
trademarks. 272 Absent facts similar to those found in the Bourjois
cases, the court found the section inapplicable to genuine goods.273
IV. Analysis
A. The Decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's recent holding that
nothing in the legislative history nor administrative practice supports
the affiliate exception in Customs regulations section 133.21(c)(2)
finds support in previous case law.
Decisions of previous courts reveal the legislative history is not
dispositive of the affiliate exception. 274 Generally, there is ample ev-
idence that Congress has taken notice of the affiliate exception em-
ployed by Customs. In considering enactment of the Lanham Act,
the Senate Subcommittee on Patents in 1944 was informed of the
''same person" exception promulgated by the Treasury Department
in 1936.275 In the 1950's, Congress actually considered enacting the
affiliate exception into law in order to codify the current administra-
tive policy.2 76 In 1984, Congress again took notice of the affiliate
exception when enacting the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, but it
270 Id. at 671.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 670 n.13 ("any extension of the protective authority of section 42 that Katzel
established is limited to that scenario and, accordingly, is not applicable to the present
case").
274 The conflicting decisions of courts reveal that the legislative history is not disposi-
tive of the affiliate exception issue, regardless of whether a court has found the legislative
history dispositive in its view. For example, while the D.C. Circuit in Coalition to Preserve
the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (1986), found that
the legislative history clearly precluded an affiliate exception, on appeal the Supreme
Court implicitlyfound that it did not. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
The Weil court has likewise found an absolute affiliate exception permissible in light of the
legislative history of section 526(a) of the 1930 Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham
Act. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853
(1989). However, the Vivitar and Olympus courts found that the legislative history pre-
cluded an absolute affiliate exception, finding it permissible only as a codification of en-
forcement discretion. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
275 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Hearing on H.R. 82 Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 89 (1944)).
276 See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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neither approved, nor condemned, the exception. 277 Finally, over
the past few years, Congress considered bills which would abolish
the affiliate exception; however, Congress failed to enact any of
them. 278 Hence, whether or not Congress favors the affiliate excep-
tion is inconclusive, but it is evident that it has been unable to take a
position on the issue.
Concerning the administrative practice, some courts have found
a consistent application of the affiliate exception. In Olympus Corp. v.
United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that
Customs has applied continuously the affiliate exception, or some
form of it, since first promulgating an exception in 1936.279 In K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens, also found consistent application of the exception. 280
Irrespective of the printed changes in the regulations over the years,
they found that Customs routinely excepted from section 42 cover-
age imports where the domestic and foreign trademark owners were
affiliated or subject to common control. 28'
Other courts, however, have found the administrative practice
inconsistent at best.28 2 The discrepancy in determining the consis-
tency of the administrative practice is illustrated by Olympus. The
Olympus court expressly adopted the findings of fact in Vivitar Corp. v.
United States concerning Customs' administrative practice, yet
reached a contrary conclusion.283 The Vivitar court rejected the
277 See S. REP. No. 526, 98 Cong., 2d Sess., at 87 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3627, 3631, stating:
[The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984] does not include within its cov-
erage so-called 'gray market' goods-i.e., authentic trademarked goods that
have been obtained from overseas markets. The importation of such goods is
legal under certain circumstances. For example, the treasury department has
long interpreted section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1526, to
permit the importation of such goods when the foreign and domestic users of
the trademark are affiliated through common ownership and control. See 19
C.F.R. 133.21(C).
278 See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S16095-02 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (comments by Sena-
tor Hatch on proposed Trademark Protection Act of 1988 to clarify trademark law in the
wake of K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), and invalidate the affiliate
exception); and 133 CONG. REC. S1 1892-01 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1987) (comments by Sena-
tor Hatch on his proposed amendment to section 42 of the Lanham Act to overrule Olym-
pus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Vivitar Corp. v. United States,
761 F.2d 315 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Lever 1, 652 F.Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1987)). However, con-
gressional action which was taken, i.e., the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, was spe-
cifically intended not to address the issue of gray market imports. See 134 CONG. REC.
S5864-02 (daily ed. May 13, 1988) (comments by Senator Deconcini).
279 Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1042 (1988).
280 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 309 (1988). See also supra note 161.
281 Id. at 311-12.
282 See, e.g., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
283 See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
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lower court's view that Customs had a "long standing administrative
interpretation" of section 526(a), and consequently, section 42.284
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also discredited Customs'
administrative practice even prior to its decision in Lever.285
Since arguments on the issue of the affiliate exception's validity
were limited in Lever to the legislative history and administrative
practice, 286 the court of appeal's present and limited ruling appears
to be correct. However, the court's present ruling directly affirms its
previous tentative holding in this case in 1989 that section
133.21(c)(2) is inconsistent with section 42 of the Lanham Act. 28 7 It
is the court's acceptance of its tentative holding that elicits criticism.
The present ruling has now finalized what the court tentatively held
in 1989: that section 133.21(c)(2) is invalid because of section 42 of
the Lanham Act.
At first appearance, the court's decision appears to follow the
line of cases interpreting "copy and simulate" in light of the expan-
sive territorial reading of the Bourjois cases. The court recognized
that Lever possessed distinct goodwill in the United States which
would be impaired by allowing the importation of goods from the
United Kingdom. Hence the court found that use of the United
Kingdom trademark in the United States would "copy" the United
States trademark. 288 One rationale for this holding is that consum-
ers would be unable to tell, by recognizing the products' trademarks,
that the United Kingdom products were not marketed and backed by
Lever, the accustomed distributor. This rationale, i.e., protection of
a domestic trademark owner's goodwill from confusion of sponsor-
ship, is representative of cases like Osawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo,2 89 In
re Certain Alkaline Batteries,29 0 and Premier Dental Products Co. v. Darby
Dental Supply Co. 2 9 1 All of these cases attempt to protect the domes-
tic trademark owner's investment in promoting and developing its
trademark from free riding by gray market importers.
A second rationale for the court's decision in Lever is that con-
sumers would be unable to tell, by recognizing the products' trade-
marks, that the United Kingdom products materially differed from
the United States products which consumers were accustomed to
purchasing. This rationale, i.e., protection of a domestic trademark
owner's goodwill from confusion over the goods' quality and nature,
is representative of those section 32 gray market cases dealing with
284 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
285 Coalition, 790 F.2d at 916.
286 Lever IV, 981 F.2d 1330, 1333-38 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
287 Lever 1I, 877 F.2d 101, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
288 Id. at I11.
289 See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
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gray market goods that differ materially: Selchow & Righter Co. v.
Goldex Co.,292 Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp.,293 Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics,294 and Societe Des Produits Nestle,
S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc. 29 5 All of these cases concern protection of
the domestic trademark owner's reputation for a certain standard of
quality.
However, the support these cases provide for Lever may be illu-
sionary. Both the approach taken by the courts in these cases and
their reliance upon a territoriality construction of Katzel and Aldridge
raises doubt as to whether they were decided correctly as a matter of
positive law, 29 6 especially in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. First, these courts reached their decision
based upon considerations other than a strictly literal interpretation
of the plain meaning of "copy," and hence, these cases may be pro-
cedurally deficient. In defining "copy," these courts did not con-
sider the specific relationship between the foreign and domestic
trademark owners particularly relevant. Juxtaposed to these cases is
the approach taken in K Mart, where the Court employed a very tech-
nical analysis in interpreting the plain meaning of section 526(a) of
the Tariff Act of 1930. Rather than evaluate policy implications and
discern legislative intent, six Justices interpreted the statutory lan-
guage at issue by their own "common understanding."'297 They de-
termined the reasonableness of section 133.21 (c)(2) as applied to
three different relationships between the foreign and domestic trade-
mark owners, solely on their understanding of the language of sec-
tion 526(a). 298 For Lever to stand on appeal, the Court would have to
interpret section 42's "copy or simulate" to include more than just
similar goods bearing counterfeit or spurious trademarks, but also
genuine, albeit materially differing, gray market goods. This inclu-
sion of genuine goods most likely contradicts the common under-
standing of gray market goods which "copy or simulate," 299 and
such an interpretation is especially strained in view of the differences
292 See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 201-11 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
296 Recall that this Note does not attempt to explore the merits of policy arguments
concerning gray market imports. See supra note 19.
297 The six Justices simply judged whether the words "owned by" were in their opin-
ion sufficiently ambiguous so as to admit an affiliate exception. See supra note 180 and
accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
299 The common understanding of "copy or simulate" encompasses the proposition
that a thing cannot copy itself. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823, 244
(ITC), disapproved by 225 U.S.P.Q. 862 (Pres U.S.) appeal dismissed, Duracell v. ITC, 778 F.2d
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Hearings Before a SubComm. of the Comm. on Patents on H.R. 82,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1944) (interpreting Customs regulations implementing section
27's "copy or simulate" language to be inapplicable to section 526(a), dealing with identi-
cal trademarks, since a trademark cannot copy itself).
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of opinion as to the validity of territoriality. If the Court were to
employ a technical analysis of section 42 without regard for policy
considerations, as it did in K Mart, the likely result would be reversal.
Furthermore, not only does the Court's failure in K Mart to ad-
dress legislative intent and trademark theories suggest that Lever and
its supporting cases have taken the wrong approach, but the Court's
explicit categorization of different gray market cases based upon the
relationship between the foreign and domestic trademark owners
suggests that this relationship and its ramifications are the more perti-
nent inquiry. Analyzing these cases supporting Lever under the cate-
gorical approach exemplified in K Mart significantly undermines
their support. Lever's reliance upon Dial, Appalachian Artworks, and
Nestle dissipates, for all are Case 3 scenarios. 300 Support for Lever
from Goldex and Darby Dental also fails, for both are Case 1 prototypi-
cal gray market situations.3 0' In fact, there are only two cases which
support Lever: Osawa (Case 2a) and In re Certain Alkaline Batteries
(Case 2b). 30 2 Conversely, the cases supporting the universal theory
discussed in this Note are all Case 2a situations and support the
overruling of Lever, also a Case 2a situation.303 These cases include
Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States, Olympus Corp. v. United States, NEC
Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco, and Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v.
Dash.304
Second, the courts in all of the above cases supporting Lever
viewed Katzel and Aldridge as establishing broad principles of territo-
riality, 30 5 an interpretation refuted by the Justices in K Mart who ac-
tually considered the Boujois rulings; hence, these cases may be
substantively erroneous as well as procedurally flawed. While a ma-
jority of the K Mart Court did not address the Bourjois cases, Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, found that these
two cases should be limited to where the foreign and domestic trade-
mark owners are independent, i.e., Case 1 instances.306 In attempt-
ing to discern the underlying intent behind section 526(a), Justice
300 In each of these cases, the gray market good was manufactured by a licensee of the
registered trademark owner, or one of its affiliates.
301 In both Goldex and Darby Dental, the plaintiff purchased, at arm's length, the right to
be the exclusive trademark registrant in the United States from an unaffiliated foreign
trademark owner, as did Bourjois in Katzel and Aldridge.
302 Osawa represents a Case 2a situation because the domestic trademark owner is a
subsidiary of the foreign trademark owner. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries is a Case 2b
situation because the Belgian corporation which manufactures Duracell batteries is owned
by Duracell, Inc.
303 Lever presents a Case 2a situation because Lever is a subsidiary of a subsidiary of
Unilever N.V., the corporate grandparent of the foreign manufacturer, Lever UK.
304 In all of these cases, the plaintiff could be deemed a subsidiary of the foreign trade-
mark owner manufacturing the gray market imports.
305 See supra notes 187-247 and accompanying text.
306 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 295 (1988) (BrennanJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Cf Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 669
(3d. Cir.) (finding "Brennan's opinion ... demonstrates that Katzel was not intended to
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Brennan examined the equities in Katzel, the case that spawned sec-
tion 526(a), because there was little legislative history behind the en-
actment of the section.3 0 7 He concluded that Congress' sole goal
was to overrule the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel. 308 Specifi-
cally, Justice Brennan concluded that Congress sought to protect
American investments in the goodwill of trademarks, purchased by
American companies from independent foreign firms, by protecting
the trademarks from gray market imports. 30 9 He found that such a
goal was consistent with the Congressional intent, "characteristic of
the times, to protect only domestic interests.1 310 But Justice Bren-
nan found the equities in a Case 2 situation (such as Lever) did not
warrant such extreme protective measures. 3 1' He noted that the
"firm and its foreign affiliate ... can respond with a panoply of op-
tions that are unavailable to the independent purchaser of a foreign
trademark," like the plaintiffs in Katzel and Aldridge.
3 12
If Justice Brennan is correct that Katzel represents an exception
to universalism, then section 42 of the Lanham Act should not afford
greater trademark protection than section 526(a) of the Tariff Act.
Under the prevailing view of trademark law prior to Katzel, as found
in Fred Gretsch Manufacturing Co. v. Schoening, section 27 of the Trade-
Mark Law of 1905 did not prohibit gray market imports.3 1 3 If the
Court's decision in Katzel and Aldridge did not replace universalism
with territoriality, then the incorporation of Katzel into section 27 by
Aldridge would not prohibit gray market imports except in Katzel situ-
ations. 31 4 Consequently, section 42, the predecessor of section 27,
would also not prohibit gray market imports except in Katzel situa-
extend the provisions of section 42 or section 32 to the case 2 instance"), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 853 (1989).
307 Not only did Congress pass section 526(a) as a "midnight amendment," giving it
only ten minutes of debate upon the floor, but it was enacted as part of a tariff statute and
not as part of a trademark statute. K Mart, 484 U.S. at 303. Justice Brennan pointed out
that if Congress had not intended solely to overrule the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel,
then surely it would have devoted more attention to such a sweeping change in trademark
law. Id.
308 Id. at 304.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 297.
311 Id. at 301-02.
312 Id. at 302.
313 See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
314 Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 670 n.13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 853 (1989). While the court acknowledged the strength of this argument, it de-
clined to take a position. Finding Katzel limited to facts not found in [Veil, the court de-
cided not to explore the effects of Katzel upon section 42 and section 526(a). Id. See also
NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 n.4 (9th Cir.) (finding its holding,
that there is no violation of section 42 by gray market imports, consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in K Mart, that there is no violation of section 526(a) by gray
market goods in Case 2a situations; and expressing its view that "foreign producers will
not be able to accomplish under trademark law what they cannot do under the Tariff
Act"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987). Cf Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552,
1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding section 42, but not section 526(a), limited to infringement
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tions, and trademark registrants would fare no better in obtaining an
injunction under section 42 than under section 526(a).
B. Implicationw
After Lever, the next logical step for trademark owners will be to
relitigate trademark protection against importation of gray market
goods whose material differences are of a de minimis nature. Be-
cause of the difficulty in determining material differences, the degree
of evidence required to show material differences is extremely
low. 3 15 Accordingly, almost every domestic trademark owner will be
able to distinguish his goods from the gray market goods with little
or no difficulty, bringing the goods under the trademark protection
afforded by Lever.316 Even without this "slippery slope" phenome-
non, there is ammunition in Lever for domestic trademark registrants
to attack the current position of allowing importation of indistin-
guishable gray market goods. The ban on indistinguishable gray
market goods is supported by the second objective found in Lever:
the protection of the trademark owners' goodwill, as defined under
the territoriality theory of trademarks. Under such a theory, good-
will can be impaired not only by confusion as to the nature and qual-
ity of the goods, but also as to sponsorship of the goods.3 17 The fact
that the affiliate exception is inapplicable to cases of confusion as to
the nature and quality of the goods supports the proposition that the
exception would be inapplicable to cases of confusion over
sponsorship.
V. Conclusion
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit invali-
dated Customs' regulation section 133.21(c)(2), the "affiliate excep-
tion," under section 42 of the Lanham Act when applied to cases of
materially differing but genuine gray market goods. The ruling rep-
resents a huge victory for registered trademark owners in the United
cases, and thus, section 526(a) encompassing the protection afforded by section 42), cerl.
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
315 Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 644 (1st Cir.
1992) (finding a low threshold of materiality, i.e., any differences a consumer would deem
relevant when making a purchase).
316 Cf Lever 11, 877 F.2d 101, 110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding an incentive on behalf
of domestic trademark registrants to bring false claims of non-identity in petitioning Cus-
toms to bar gray market imports).
317 See Nestle, 982 F.2d at 639 n.7 ("We think the appropriate test should not be strictly
limited to physical differences. Other sorts of differences-differences in, say, warranty
protection or service commitments-may well render products non-identical in the rele-
vant Lanham Trade-Mark Act sense"); see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Gra-
nada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987), and
Osawa & Co. v. B. & H. Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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States, 318 for it eventually will force Customs to prohibit, at the
trademark registrants' request, the importation of all goods bearing
their trademarks, regardless of who manufactured the goods, if the
goods differ materially.3 1 9
Currently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is the only circuit
to have addressed the issue of the affiliate exception for materially
different gray market goods under section 42 and found the excep-
tion invalid. Many courts have determined gray market goods can
infringe the registered trademark owner's rights, but the majority of
the cases fall into either the Case 1 or Case 3 scenarios,3 20 as estab-
lished in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. ,s21 while a minority fall into the
Case 2 scenarios.3 22 Many courts, notably the Third and Ninth Cir-
cuits, have found that genuine gray market goods cannot violate sec-
tion 42 in Case 2a situations.3 23 Lever Brothers Corp. v. United States
presents a Case 2a situation. Hence, there is an emerging conflict
between the circuits as to whether and when genuine gray market
goods can "copy or simulate" the corresponding domestic goods
under section 42 of the Lanham Act.
Based upon the Supreme Court's decision in K Mart, Lever
should be overruled. First, whereas the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals analyzed the policy justifications for disallowing the affiliate ex-
ception, the Supreme Court favored a technical analysis of the
statutory language to determine whether there was sufficient ambi-
guity to allow an affiliate exception.3 2 4 Furthermore, even if policy
matters should be considered, the D.C. Circuit Court failed to ac-
knowledge recent unsuccessful attempts in Congress to overrule
Customs' regulations,3 25 possibly representing congressional ap-
proval of Customs' regulations.3 2 6 Second, whereas the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined the meaning of "copy or
simulate" without regard to the affiliate relation, the Supreme
Court's categorical approach emphasized a reliance on such a rela-
tionship. Application of the K Mart Court's analysis to the cases
318 See, e.g., Karen Donovan, Manufacturers Hailing Ruling on Gray Market, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 1, 1993, at i.
319 Customs informed trademark owners on June 26, 1992, 57 Fed. Reg. 28605
(1992), that they must advise it if they believe they have trademarks which would now
prohibit imports because of the invalidation of section 133.21(c)(2) in Lever IV. Even
though the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit limited the injunction to cases involving
the British Shield and Sunlight products, see supra note 90, national relief is only a sum-
mary judgment away.
320 See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
322 See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 262-273 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
326 See, e.g., Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding
Congressional acquiescence in notice and failure to act), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
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seemingly supporting Lever reveals that only two cases actually pro-
vided support, Osawa and In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, as they fall in
the same category as Lever; 327 on the other hand, a majority of cases
falling in Lever's category support an opposite result. 328 Finally, if
Katzel is viewed as an exception to universalism rather than an adop-
tion of territoriality, then domestic trademark owners should not be
able to obtain injunctions against importing gray market goods
under section 42 of the Lanham Act if they cannot obtain them
under 526(a) of the Tariff Law of 1930.329 Support for universalism,
subject to Case 1 exceptions, is found injustice Brennan's opinion in
K Mart, which was joined by Justices Stevens and Marshall. 330
In essence, because the K Mart Court failed to address the valid-
ity of the affiliate exception against a section 42 challenge,33 1 and
because a majority of the K Mart Court failed to address the underly-
ing principles of trademark law bearing upon the interpretations of
section 526(a) and the affiliate exception, federal statutory trademark
law remains uncertain. 332 In the wake of such uncertainty, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Lever represents an expansion
of trademark law with uncertain limits.
C. DUSTIN TILLMAN
327 Both Osawa and In re Certain Alkaline Batteries are Case 2a situations. See supra
note 228 and accompanying text, and notes 235-37 and accompanying text, respectively.
328 See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
329 See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
330 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 295 (1988); see also supra notes 306-12
and accompanying text.
331 William H. Allen, the attorney who argued K Mart for the respondents in the
Supreme Court, believes the Court should have addressed the affiliate exception since, by
its own terms, section 133.21 implemented not only section 526(a) of the Tariff Act, but
also section 42 of the Lanham Act. William H. Allen, The Supreme Court's Gray-Market Deci-
sion, 70J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 688, 690 (1988).
332 See, e.g., Rian Miller-Mclrvine, Note, Trademark Law-Gray 11arket Goods in Domestic
Markets-Lever Bros. v. United States, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 189, 197 and 199 (1990) (finding that
-[t]he gray market controversy begs for a legislative response," and that a "[c]ontinued
struggle in the courts to resolve the gray market controversy is a questionable allocation of
resources"); Vincent N. Palladino, Gray .M1arket Goods: The United States Trademark Owner's
View, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 158, 208 (1988) (concluding that the uncertainty in gray market
law can only be resolved through legislative means).
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